Ostium

Liquidation and auto-deleveraging 16/20

How positions are picked for auto-deleveraging

None by design; the docs say how the pool pays profitsNo ADL, and the vault docs say winning traders are paid in USDC from onchain capital, a junior buffer absorbs PnL before OLP, and deposits are blocked when the vault is under-collateralized.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Partial liquidation

NoThe liquidation page describes only full liquidation at a threshold and says there is no partial recovery after liquidation.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Auto-deleveraging in the last 24 months

None foundThe docs have no ADL mechanism, and news searches since Nov 2024 found only the July 2026 oracle exploit, which was not an ADL event.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Risky markets isolated or capped

YesMargin is isolated per position (each trade has its own liquidation threshold set by its own leverage), and per-pair leverage caps run from 5x to 200x; no OI cap values are published.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Insurance fund and who absorbs losses No data

Still missing: backstop against total open interest.

Backstop balance readable on-chain

YesThe vault and its junior buffer are held onchain, and the buffer is rebalanced onchain at daily settlement.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Backstop against total open interest

Not confirmed yetThe docs give no buffer size, target or vault TVL figure, and no dated open-interest figure was found.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Order of loss absorption published

YesThe junior buffer absorbs trader PnL first, in full, then OLP; security losses fall first on onchain capital, including OLP.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Price oracle 4/15

Independent sources in the liquidation price

Not disclosedThe current docs say prices come from 'multiple market data providers' but give no count, replacing the deprecated single-feed page.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Price update interval

Every secondThe docs say prices update on a roughly sub-second basis.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Who signs prices

One key or one serviceThe docs now say multiple publishers sign prices, but the July 2026 exploit showed that one authorized signer was enough and the docs describe no quorum.alpha.rekt.news (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Oracle failure with user losses, last 24 months

YesAbout $23.75M was drained from OLP through fraudulent signed price reports.alpha.rekt.news (opens in a new tab) · 15 July 2026

Custody and withdrawal 4/15

Users hold their own funds

Yesdocs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Contract-level exit if the operator stops

Not disclosedTraders can call the contracts directly, but no forced-withdrawal or exit path for an operator or oracle halt is described.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Withdrawals can be frozen without a delayed vote

YesThe team froze all trading contracts within about an hour in July 2026.cryptobriefing.com (opens in a new tab) · 15 July 2026

Delay before upgrades apply

Not disclosedThe protocol docs do not mention multisig, timelock or upgradeability.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Incidents in the last 24 months 1/15

• 15 July 2026Exploit, losses not repaid−10

  About 23.75M USDC was drained from the OLP vault through fake price reports signed by a compromised authorized signer; losses up to 1,000 USDC are repaid in full, and larger losses go to a proportional Phase 2 recovery, so full repayment is not guaranteed.

  cryptobriefing.com (opens in a new tab)

• 15 July 2026Outage over 4 hours−4

  Trading was halted from the exploit on 2026-07-15 until it reopened on 2026-07-23, with new OLP deposits still paused.

  thedefiant.io (opens in a new tab)

Reviewed and not counted

• 15 July 2026Not counted: an emergency pause during an active exploit is not an intervention.

  The team paused trading and froze all trading contracts within 60 minutes of the first exploit transaction.

  cryptobriefing.com (opens in a new tab)

Liquidity 1/10

A $100,000 market order in BTC or ETH, buying and selling, moved the price by 1.29 basis points on average (2 readings, 3 November 2026). The median across the venues we measure was 1.00. The venue could not take the order in some of the cases we measured.

Who provides the liquidity

Mostly one vault, pool or market makerThe single OLP vault is the counterparty to every trade.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Transparency and operations 8/10

Public audits of core code, last 24 months

4Pashov (2025-01, 2025-04, 2026-01) and Zellic (2025-09 to 2025-11).alpha.rekt.news (opens in a new tab) · July 2026

Core code public

YesThe docs say 'Source code is published', and the security docs link the OstiumVerifier code.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Public status page

Not disclosedThere is only a machine-readable feed health endpoint (/v1/status); no human-readable status or uptime page was found in the docs index or a web search.docs.ostium.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026

Operating company named in the terms

Yeslei.bloomberg.com (opens in a new tab) · 3 November 2026